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SUMMARYPolicymakers in the US, Asia and Europe should not wait until
financial markets force adjustment in the large imbalances in global cur-
rent account positions. Although multilateral consultations organised by
the IMF began in Summer 2006, they have yet to be followed by policy
actions. The current stalemate is dangerous, as market participants are
likely to change their minds at some stage about the sustainability of
imbalances. Indications that the main players are able to agree on the
direction of desirable domestic policy changes and are willing to accept
the exchange rate implications of global current account adjustment
would help make this adjustment
orderly. The time for action is now.
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Global adjustment requires substantial
effective depreciation of the dollar and
appreciation of the Asian currencies. The
trade-weighted exchange rates of the euro
and sterling vis-à-vis their main partners
do not need to change, but this does not
mean that bilateral exchange rates
against the dollar should not move.
Although adjustment would see the euro
and sterling depreciate against currencies
in Asia, European currencies would need to
strengthen further against the dollar, to at
least $1.45 per euro and to well over $2
per pound. Policymakers in Europe should
not resist appreciation of their currencies
versus the dollar so long as it is matched
by depreciation against the yen and the
renminbi and happens in the context of a
global currency adjustment.
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1The Summary and
Policy Challenge sec-
tions on page 1 of this
policy brief were written
by Alan Ahearne and
Jean Pisani-Ferry. The
main text of this policy
brief, from page 2, was
written by all the
authors listed above. The
views presented in this
policy brief do not
necessarily represent
the opinions of the other
individuals who partici-
pated in the workshop
organised by Bruegel,
KIEP and Peterson
Institute, or of their 
institutions.b
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GLOBAL IMBALANCES: TIME FOR ACTION
ONE of the principal dangers cur-
rently facing the world economy ari-
ses from the large and unsustaina-
ble imbalances in current account
positions. Some observers argue
that these imbalances will unwind
gradually and non-disruptively,
while others emphasise the risks of
a sudden change of sentiment in
financial markets that could result
in an abrupt and damaging adjust-
ment. No one knows which scenario
will materialise, but a priority for
policymakers should be to reduce
the risks of a crisis that could pro-
duce a world recession and disrup-
tions to the global trading system.
For that, the global economy requi-
res official sponsorship of a credible
and comprehensive adjustment
programme. This policy brief outli-
nes what such a programme could
look like.
Bruegel, the Korea Institute for
International Economic Policy, and
the Peterson Institute for
International Economics held a joint
workshop including about 30 of the
world’s leading experts on how to
achieve such an
orderly reduction in
global imbalances in
Washington DC on 8
and 9 February 2007.
The purpose of the
workshop was to
compare analyses
and evaluations of
the requirements for
an adjustment of this
type. The discussions
centred on two sets of contribu-
tions: (1) country papers that provi-
ded a perspective on the underlying
factors behind surpluses and defi-
cits and the scope for adjustment in
the current account, and (2) multi-
country simulation papers that pro-
duced estimates of the changes in
policy variables and the correspon-
ding exchange rate adjustments
that are consistent with scenarios
for a reduction in current account
imbalances. 
This policy brief reports the results
of the simulation papers and sum-
marises the main policy conclu-
sions that we draw from the analy-
ses presented at the workshop. On
the basis of the discussions, we out-
line in Section 1 reasons why the
current situation is unsustainable.
Adjustment must
take place and will
require significant
movements in
exchange rates.
Section 2 argues that
adjustment induced
by policy actions is
more likely to be
orderly than one ini-
tiated by financial
markets. We view the
current stalemate
regarding policy
actions as dange-
rous, as financial market partici-
pants are likely to change their
minds at some stage about the sus-
tainability of imbalances unless
they see that the main players are
able to agree on the direction of des-
irable policy changes. Section 3 pre-
sents estimates of the exchange
rate implications of
global current
account adjustment
from a variety of
models. Section 4
describes the policy
implications that the
authors of this policy
brief drew from these
results and from the
workshop discussions.
1.WHY THE CURRENT
SITUATION IS
UNSUSTAINABLE
There has been a great deal of dis-
cussion recently of global current
account imbalances. Much of the
attention has focused on the his-
torically large US current account
deficit, which reached $857 billion
(6.5 percent of GDP) in 2006. The
counterpart to this deficit can be
found mainly in Asia and in the oil-
exporting countries. According to
the International Monetary Fund
2This estimate appears
conservative. China’s
trade surplus in goods
was $178 billion in
2006, with imports
reported on a cost,
insurance, freight (CIF)
basis. When the
imports data are adjus-
ted to free on board
(f.o.b.), the trade in
goods surplus will likely
come in at about $215
billion. Based on trends
in the other items in the
first-half balance of
payments, Nicholas
Lardy (2006) estima-
tes that China’s surplus
last year was $240 bil-
lion (see Nicholas
Lardy, Toward a
Consumption-Driven
Growth Path, Policy
Briefs in International
Economics PB06-6,
(Washington: Peterson
Institute for
International
Economics), October
2006.)
3In fact, despite conti-
nuously rising net
foreign liabilities,
income receipts on US-
owned assets abroad
were greater than
income payments on
foreign-owned assets
in the United States
until the fourth quarter
of 2005.
(IMF) China’s surplus swelled to
an estimated $184 billion (7.2
percent of GDP) in 2006
2, while
Japan recorded an estimated sur-
plus of $167 billion (3.7 percent of
GDP) last year. High oil prices pro-
pelled the surplus for countries in
the Middle East to
$282 billion last year.
There was broad
agreement among
the workshop parti-
cipants on a number
of points. First, as a
result of the
increase in global
financial integration
over the last decade
or so, larger and
more persistent cur-
rent account imba-
lances are possible for many coun-
tries today than they were in the
past. Global capital markets are
larger and more liquid, and new
financial instruments have develo-
ped that make it easier for inves-
tors to manage risk. What effect
financial globalisation and the pro-
liferation of derivative instruments
has had on the probability of a
smooth unwinding of global imba-
lances is an open question.
Second, the US is deriving signifi-
cant benefits from the situation.
Financial inflows from abroad
have boosted US asset prices and
helped to keep US long-term inte-
rest rates low, thereby spurring
and financing domestic spending
in the US. In addition, it is well
known that the return on US gross
foreign assets exceeds that on US
gross foreign liabilities. The effect
is that, although US net foreign lia-
bilities exceed 20 percent of GDP,
net income payments on these lia-
bilities are small
3.  Moreover,
because foreign claims on the US
are almost entirely priced or deno-
minated in dollars, while US  direct
and portfolio equity assets abroad
as well as a portion of credit claims
on foreigners are priced or denomi-
nated in foreign currency, the
‘What effect financial
globalisation and the
proliferation of deriva-
tive instruments has
had on the probability
of a smooth unwinding
of global imbalances is
an open question.’
‘The current situation
is unsustainable.
Adjustment must take
place and will require
significant movements
in exchange rates.’GLOBAL IMBALANCES: TIME FOR ACTION
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4For comprehensive
data on the valuation
effects, see Philip Lane
and Gian Maria Milesi-
Ferretti The External
Wealth of Nations Mark
II: Revised and
Extended Estimates of
Foreign Assets and
Liabilities, 1970-2004,
IMF Working Papers
06/69, (Washington:
International Monetary
Fund, 2006).
5See, for example,
Maurice Obstfeld and
Kenneth Rogoff, Global
Current Account
Imbalances and
Exchange Rate
Adjustments, Brookings
Papers on Economic
Activity, 1, pp. 67–146
(Washington: Brookings
Institution, 2005).
decline in the foreign exchange
value of the dollar over recent
years has boosted the dollar equi-
valent of foreign assets, thereby
reducing US net foreign liabilities
as measured in dollars. As a result,
the increase in US net foreign liabi-
lities over the past few years has
been considerably smaller than
the cumulative current account
deficits
4.
Nevertheless, the current pattern
of global imbalances is not sustai-
nable. Medium-term projections by
the IMF indicate that at unchanged
real effective exchange rates, large
current account imbalances will
persist (see Chart 1). Persistent
external deficits and surpluses of
this scale imply an implausible
accumulation of foreign liabilities
on the US side and an implausible
accumulation of assets on the
Chinese and Japanese sides. The
implied steep increase in US net
foreign liabilities (Chart 2) from
about 8 percent of world GDP (26
percent of U.S. GDP) in 2006 to
roughly 15 percent of world GDP
(over 51 percent of U.S. GDP) by
2011 raises serious questions
about the willingness of foreign
investors to continue accumula-
ting net claims on the US, especially
considering that gross foreign hol-
dings of US assets would be far lar-
ger. At some stage, foreign inves-
tors will begin to demand ever
higher returns on the US assets
that they buy, though where that
limit might be is impossible to tell
at this point.
The clear implication is that global
current account adjustment must
take place. The most elementary
theory tells us that this adjust-
ment will require movements in
exchange rates, including a
significant depreciation in the
dollar and corresponding apprecia-
tions in the currencies of other
countries, as well as a rebalancing
of demand and saving across the
globe
5.
2.WHAT ADJUSTMENT?
A key question is whether financial
markets or policy actions will ini-
tiate the necessary and inevitable
adjustment. Market sentiment can
change abruptly and the risk of a
market-led adjustment is that it
might involve global recession,
abrupt and excessive changes in
key exchange rates and asset pri-
ces and, as a consequence, aggra-
vated trade frictions. To reduce the
risk of such an outcome, policyma-
kers need to initiate a policy-indu-
ced adjustment in the near future.
The recent volatility in global finan-
cial markets is a reminder of the
dangers of failing to act promptly.
Agreement on the substance of a
policy-induced adjustment is the
purpose of the multilateral consul-
tations at the IMF initiated in
2006. However, they have not yet
achieved significant results.
Meanwhile, the US is focusing on
its bilateral relationship with
China, and the Europeans have
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GLOBAL IMBALANCES: TIME FOR ACTION
6See, Economic
Forecasting for 2007,
(Korea Development
Institute, December
2006), and 2007
Economic Forecasting,
(Samsung Economic
Research Institute,
November, 2006).
7Paul Krugman, ‘Will
There Be A Dollar
Crisis?’ Paper presen-
ted at the Economic
Policy Panel at the
Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, 12 February
2007, available at
www.cepr.org.
been getting vocal about the yen.
Yet the issue of adjustment has a
multilateral character. Thus, a mul-
tilateral institution or forum, such
as the one convened by the IMF or
possibly an informal Group of Four
(US, euro area or the European
Union, Japan, and China), would
seem to be the appropriate venue
to deal with it.
There is a large degree
of convergence in the
economic interest of
the key players:
• The US needs to
bring its current
account deficit
down to an accep-
table level and this
will require a signi-
ficant effective depreciation of
the dollar and higher US natio-
nal saving.
• China needs to curb its accu-
mulation of foreign exchange
reserves, rebalance growth
towards domestic demand,
and continue removing distor-
tions that favour exporting
industries.
• Although Japan’s weak
exchange rate and ultra-low
interest rates have been ins-
trumental in countering defla-
tion, economic recovery now
permits the return of monetary
policy and the exchange rate to
a more neutral stance.
• Europe’s currencies have
already appreciated substan-
tially both against the dollar
and in effective terms. For
Europeans, the priority is to
avoid an overshooting of their
currencies that might result
from a disorderly adjustment.
However, it is important to
recognise that an effective
depreciation of the dollar and
an effective appreciation of
the Asian currencies imply a
further bilateral appreciation
of the euro and sterling against
the dollar. Otherwise, there
would be an effective deprecia-
tion of the euro and sterling,
eroding the extent of potential
US external adjustment.
• The Korean won, like the
European currencies, has
already appreciated sharply
both against the
dollar and in effec-
tive terms. If
Korea’s current
account remains
in small surplus
as projected by
the IMF, then its
currency would
need to appre-
ciate further
against the dollar
in the context of global adjust-
ment.  If instead its current
account swings toward signifi-
cant deficit in 2007-08, as is
being forecast by some Korean
institutions, then more limited
appreciation against the dollar
and corresponding partial
reversal of the trade-weighted
appreciation experienced to
date could be appropriate
6.
• Several key oil exporting coun-
tries have adopted a more pru-
dent and forward-looking
approach than they did in the
1970s and 1980s
and are likely to
build their stocks
of foreign assets
further. In other
words, these
countries’ margi-
nal propensity to
spend out of oil
revenues is less
than one.
However, their
surpluses need to
decline as domestic absorp-
tion gradually expands.
In spite of this potential conver-
gence of interest, the main partici-
pants have not embarked on a set
of policies that clearly signal their
intention to tackle the problem of
global imbalances. This stalemate
is dangerous, and it is imprudent
to delay a change in stance until
financial markets conclude that
the present situation is unsustai-
nable
7. Of particular concern
already are:
• The trade frictions between
China and the US arising from
China’s exchange rate policy.
• The weakness of the yen.
Although it has strengthened
moderately recently, it
remains very weak on a histori-
cal basis. This weakness not
only contributes to the US
trade deficit but also hurts
other economies in Asia that
have suffered a loss of compe-
titiveness against Japan. Yen-
funded carry trades may have
begun to unwind, but any
rebound in the amount of such
trades may weaken the yen
again. A weaker yen would not
be consistent with the ongoing
recovery in Japan’s economy
and accompanying prospec-
tive tightening of Japanese
monetary policy.
3.ADJUSTMENT SCENARIOS 
To examine what a return to sustai-
nability might
mean for exchange
rates, participants
in the workshop
were asked to pre-
sent estimates of
the exchange rate
implications of cur-
rent account
adjustment scena-
rios in which the US
current account
deficit narrowed to
3 percent of GDP in the medium
term. The scenarios differ in how
the burden of adjustment is sha-
red among individual countries in
the rest of the world, but all scena-
rios assume that most of the
‘Effective depreciation
of the dollar and Asian
currencies implies a
further bilateral appre-
ciation of the euro and
sterling against the dol-
lar.’
‘The main participants
have not embarked on
a set of policies to
tackle the problem of
global imbalances.
This stalemate is 
dangerous’GLOBAL IMBALANCES: TIME FOR ACTION
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8See papers presented
at the workshop by
Martin Baily, ‘Dollar
Adjustment To Reduce
The US Imbalance’;
William R. Cline
‘Estimating Reference
Exchange Rates’; and
Thomas Stolper and
Monica Fuentes,
‘GSDEER and Trade
Elasticities’.
9International
Monetary Fund (2006),
‘Methodologies for CGER
Exchange Rate
Assessments’
(November 2006).
10See paper presented
at the workshop by Ray
Barrell, Dawn Holland
and Ian Hurst
‘Correcting US
Imbalances’. The
results presented by
Christopher Erceg are
based on the Federal
Reserve Board’s SIGMA
model. For more details
on SIGMA, see
www.ijcb.org.
11See papers presented
by Agnès Bénassy-
Quéré, Amina Lahrèche-
Révil and Valérie
Mignon, ‘World
Consistent Equilibrium
Exchange Rates’; and
Ronald MacDonald and
Preèthike Dias, ‘BEER
Estimates and Target
Current Account
Imbalances’.
adjustment would be borne by
China, Japan, other Asian econo-
mies, a few high-surplus European
economies not in the euro area,
and the oil-exporting countries.
The external balance of the euro
area, which is projected to be in
slight deficit in 2007, is assumed
unchanged. An important goal
behind all scenarios is that the
adjustment should take place
without depressing the rate of
growth of world GDP.
Three types of approaches were
used to assess those implications:
• Partial equilibrium ‘trade elas-
ticities’ models: the Baily
model of US trade
performance, the
Cline model of opti-
mal exchange rate
realignment, and
the Stolper and
Fuentes elasticity
model are in this tra-
dition
8. So are the
macroeconomic
balance and exter-
nal sustainability
approaches outlined in the IMF
(2006) review of methodolo-
gies for equilibrium exchange
rate assessment
9.
• Macroeconomic models: The
NiGEM model estimates prepa-
red by Barrell, Holland and
Hurst are in this tradition, as
are the Federal Reserve estimates
with a dynamic general equili-
brium model referred to by
Christopher Erceg
10.
• Reduced-form estimates of
equilibrium exchange rates:
The Bénassy-Quéré, Lahrèche-
Révil and Mignon estimates,
and those by Stolper and
Fuentes using the Goldman
Sachs dynamic equilibrium
exchange rate (GSDEER) model
and by MacDonald and Dias
using the behavioural equili-
brium exchange rate (BEER)
model, are in this family
11.  So is
the equilibrium real exchange
rate approach
described in the
IMF (2006)
paper.
Box 1 describes
in more detail the
models and
approaches used
in the workshop
papers. Table 1
contains estima-
tes presented to the workshop of
the changes in the real effective
exchange rates of the main curren-
cies required to meet the objecti-
ves for a reduced US current
account deficit
12.
Table 2 presents the equivalent
changes in bilateral real exchange
rates against the US dollar.
Markets tend to focus on this
figure, but it is the wrong figure in
determining the extent of the eco-
nomic effects of exchange rate
changes. The average (i.e. effec-
tive) exchange rate movements
shown in Table 1 are of far greater
importance, because they are
what determine the change in
trade outcomes for each country.
They also tend to be much smaller,
for the fundamental economic rea-
son that many countries are pos-
tulated to be appreciating their
exchange rates against the dollar
simultaneously.
• In principle, the extent of
exchange rate adjustment
depends on the underlying fac-
tors behind surpluses or defi-
cits and on what policy actions
are taken. Also, as the U.S. defi-
cit shrinks, the assumed distri-
bution of the adjustment
across the rest of the world
matters. Specifically, the grea-
ter the share of the adjustment
that a country undertakes
through a decline in its current
account balance, the larger the
required appreciation of that
country’s real effective
exchange rate.
• The models generally find that
a real effective depreciation of
Table 1
Real effective exchange rate change required to reduce U.S. current account deficit to 3 per cent of GDP in the
medium term (percent change; + implies appreciation, - implies depreciation)
US dollar Japanese yen Chinese RMB Euro
Martin Baily -15 to-20 n.e. n.e. n.e.
Ray Barrell, Dawn Holland and Ian Hurst -11 to -19 +10 to +14 +3 to +7 -3 to +6
Bill Cline (a) -18 +11 to +13 +11 to +18 0
Thomas Stolper and Monica Fuentes (b) -16 +18 +5 +2
Ronald MacDonald and Preèthike Dias -11* +6 +27 0
Chris Erceg (c) -8 to -25 n.e. n.e. n.e.
n.e. (not estimated). (*) Using preferred coefficient estimate.  (a) From Jan-Aug 2006 average.  Range refers to two model variants applied to the three scenarios
considered by the workshop. (b) Only results from the elasticity model reported. (c) Range refers to the different shocks that are being unwound.
‘The effective exchange
rate movements are of
far greater impor-
tance: they determine
the change in trade
outcomes.’GLOBAL IMBALANCES: TIME FOR ACTION
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12We exclude from the
comparisons estimates
that do not meet the
specifications of the
scenario. Estimates
from Bénassy-Quéré,
Lahrèche-Révil and
Mignon, as well as those
of the GSDEER approach
of Stolper and Fuentes,
did not examine what
exchange rate changes
would be required to
meet the 3 percent of
GDP target for the US
current account deficit
specified in the work-
shop terms of reference.
Both found surprisingly
that the dollar was
undervalued, implying
that those models find
financial markets to be
comfortable with a per-
sistent US current
account deficit much
higher than this target,
at least for an extremely
long period.  Both
models are subject to
the possible problems
noted in box 1 (third
approach).  Moreover,
the alternative elastici-
ties model estimated by
Stolper and Fuentes pro-
duced results more in
line with those of the
other papers.
13The implied yen/dollar
figure assumes that
most of the required
movement in the real
bilateral exchange rate
comes about through a
change in the nominal
exchange rate.
the dollar of between 10 and
20 percent from the current
level is needed to shrink the
U.S. current account deficit to 3
percent of GDP over the next
few years.
• To reduce the Japanese current
account surplus to levels speci-
fied in the scenarios (that is, to
between $36 billion and $54
billion, depending on the sce-
nario, from $167 billion in
2006), the models typically
find that a real effective appre-
ciation in the yen of between
10 percent and 15 percent is
needed. This movement requi-
res a 25 percent to 30 percent
real appreciation of the yen vis-
à-vis the dollar, moving the
exchange rate to around 90
yen/dollar compared with
roughly 118 yen/dollar today
13.
• The workshop produced a fairly
wide range of estimates for the
required movement in the
Chinese renminbi. This uncer-
tainty in part reflects the diffi-
culty of estimating precisely
the sensitivity of Chinese
exports and imports to
exchange rate movements
14.
Effective appreciation of bet-
ween 5 and 25 percent was
calculated to be required to
reduce China's surplus by bet-
ween roughly 3.5 and 6.5 per-
centage points of GDP (with
the low end of the range being
accompanied by an expansion
of domestic demand in China
that more than compensated
for the loss of
foreign demand).
As in the case of
the Japanese
currency, this
strengthening of
the renminbi in
effective terms
implies a subs-
tantially larger
bilateral appre-
ciation against
the dollar.
• Since the scenarios assume a
roughly unchanged current
account deficit in the euro
area, little or no change in the
effective value of the euro is
needed. As the models find
that the euro depreciates
against the Asian currencies, a
stable effective euro implies a
marked bilateral appreciation
of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar
to between $1.45 and $1.50
per euro compared with about
$1.32 today.
To summarise, the model estima-
tes presented at the workshop pla-
ced the order of magnitude of
effective depreciation of the dollar
needed to bring about the targeted
adjustment at around 15 percent.
Effective appreciations of around
10 percent for the yen and 15 per-
cent for the renminbi would pro-
vide part of the
counterpart. To bring
about these effec-
tive exchange rate
movements, much
larger bilateral
appreciations
against the dollar
would be required,
of maybe 25 to 30
percent for the yen
and 30 percent for
the renminbi. But there will also be
a need for substantial bilateral
appreciations against the dollar by
currencies whose effective
exchange rates do not need to
change. In particular, the euro
would need to strengthen to at
least $1.45 per euro, while sterling
would rise to well over $2 per
pound.
Finally, although the primary focus
of the workshop was on the cur-
rencies of countries taking part in
the IMF multilateral talks, curren-
cies of other economies running
large external surpluses would
also need to appreciate on an
effective basis in order to meet the
targets for correcting global imba-
Table 2
Bilateral real exchange rate change against the U.S. dollar consistent with the REER movements in Table 1
(percent change; + implies appreciation)
Japanese yen Chinese RMB Euro
Martin Baily n.e. n.e. n.e.
Ray Barrell, Dawn Holland and Ian Hurst +24 +18 +16
Bill Cline (a) +28 to +39 +31 to +44 +20
Thomas Stolper and Monica Fuentes (b) +25 +10 +15
Ronald MacDonald and Preèthike Dias n.e. n.e. n.e.
Chris Erceg n.e. n.e. n.e.
n.e. (not estimated). (a) See table 1, note a. (b) Nominal exchange rates. Only results from the elasticity model reported.
‘The models generally
find that a real effec-
tive depreciation of the
dollar of between 10
percent and 20 per-
cent is needed.’GLOBAL IMBALANCES: TIME FOR ACTION
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14The time series of
data on Chinese exports
and imports is relati-
vely short. In addition,
the enormous structu-
ral changes that the
Chinese economy has
undergone over the
past decade complicate
econometric estimates
of China’s trade elastici-
ties. Generally, the
more sensitive to
exchange rate move-
ments that China’s
trade is estimated to
be, the less apprecia-
tion of the renminbi is
needed.
15For four East Asian
economies (Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Singapore,
and Taiwan) and four
European economies
(Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and
Russia) with large cur-
rent account surpluses,
the combined weight in
the Federal Reserve’s
broad real exchange
rate index for the dollar
amounts to 13.2 per-
cent, higher than that
of either China (11.3
percent) or Japan
(10.5 percent).
lances specified in the workshop
scenarios. Otherwise US external
adjustment would fall below target.
The combined role of the smaller
surplus economies in Asia and
Europe (outside of the euro area)
in the adjustment process will be
more important than either China
or Japan
15.  This consideration illus-
trates once again the multilateral
nature of the adjustment problem,
which to date has arguably been
addressed with an excessive
emphasis on just one facet: the US-
China relationship.
4.POLICY CHOICES
The authors of this brief draw the
following policy implications:
• With the US economy currently
operating close to full employ-
ment, adjustment requires a
rate of growth in US domestic
demand below that of output
over coming years to prevent
inflationary excess demand. A
prime candidate to facilitate
this adjustment is fiscal
contraction to offset the increa-
sing contribution to growth
from rising U.S. net exports. A
rebalancing of world demand
between the United States and
East Asia is indispensable.
• Japan and China hold the key
to the adjustment in Asia.
Unless both Japanese and
Chinese policymakers accept
the appreciation of their cur-
rencies, it is difficult to see
how the adjustment process
can start in Asia as other Asian
economies would in turn resist
the appreciation of their cur-
rencies. Moreover, Japan has
been at the forefront of promo-
ting monetary integration in
Asia. A Japan that is commit-
ted to cooperation on
exchange rate policy in Asia
should take the lead in the
region on exchange rate
adjustment against the dollar.
BOX 1
MODELS AND APPROACHES
Three broad modelling approaches were applied by the workshop paper
authors to investigate equilibrium exchange rates.  The most traditional
approach was the partial equilibrium “trade elasticities” method in
conjunction with judgmental current account targets.  In this approach,
exports and imports depend on the price incentive provided by the real
effective exchange rate, and on the impact of foreign income on demand
for exports and of domestic income on demand for imports.  The more
complete models in this genre include detailed treatment of foreign asset
and liability changes and rates of return.  These models examine the mag-
nitude of the exchange rate change needed to shift the current account
from baseline to target levels.  A strength of this approach is its transpa-
rency.  It does, of course, require a judgment about the size of the current
account deficit that is sustainable.  There is no explicit modelling of how
an exchange rate change is to be achieved (under floating rates). A limita-
tion is that it does not attempt specific modelling of how the correspon-
ding change in absorption is composed (higher private saving, lower
public dissaving, and/or less investment).
The second approach is to shock a macroeconometric model in such a
way that it generates a targeted change in the current account over a cer-
tain horizon.  In principle, a strength of this approach is that it takes into
account feedback effects and explicitly incorporates the monetary and
fiscal policies needed to generate a desired shock.  An important limita-
tion is the underlying return-to-equilibrium structure of the model, which
typically assumes the economy begins in equilibrium and therefore after
a shock returns toward the same starting point over time from feedback
effects.  However, the normal policy-feedback rules (such as a “Taylor
rule” for monetary policy) that characterize such models are inappro-
priate when the economy starts in a disequilibrium requiring a policy
change.  This class of models also provides considerably less transpa-
rency than the partial equilibrium models in attributing the calculated
changes in outcomes to specific changes in the model inputs.
The third approach is econometric modelling of the influences that are
found internationally to be associated with strong or weak real exchange
rates, including such variables as net foreign assets and productivity
growth.  In this approach, the coefficients estimated from international
experience are applied to the country in question to determine whether
its exchange rate is overvalued or undervalued, and by how much.  A
major limitation of this approach is that it must assume not only that the
period observed is one in which on average the countries in the sample
are at equilibrium exchange rates, but also that the overall coefficients
estimated for the panel of countries apply to the country of direct interest
(e.g., the United States).  A related limitation is that there is no explicit
attention to erosion or improvement of a country’s relative position over
time from factors not directly in the model, such as the secular adverse
shift for the United States implied by the findings by Martin Baily.  There
are difficulties in measurement, such as the use of consumer to producer
price ratios to proxy productivity - thereby potentially placing what
amounts to the real exchange rate on both sides of the equation.  There
are also difficulties of policy interpretation, such as the result in the IMF
model indicating that a larger fiscal deficit is associated with a stronger
real exchange rate, even though running a larger fiscal deficit is not a sus-
tainable means of achieving equilibrium.GLOBAL IMBALANCES: TIME FOR ACTION
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16Pre-1999 calculation
uses the value of a syn-
thetic euro based on
the value of its legacy
currencies.
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• Now that the yen has begun to
strengthen, it is important that
Japan should not intervene to
bail out speculators that enga-
ged in the yen carry trade when
the yen was very weak.
Moreover, it is reasonable to
expect that the yen will appre-
ciate further in the near term
as the Bank of Japan continues
its moves towards normalising
monetary policy. If not, there
would be a case for interven-
tion in foreign exchange mar-
kets to push the yen higher. In
this regard, we note that on a
real effective basis the yen is
currently at its lowest level
since 1986 and that it stands
about 20 percent below its ave-
rage over the 20-year period
since then. By comparison,
when there was coordinated
intervention to boost the euro
in late 2000, the real effective
euro was 19 percent below its
20-year average
16.
• In China, priority should be
given to further eli-
minating distor-
tions favouring
exporting sectors
and gearing
macroeconomic
policy towards pro-
moting domestic
demand. Given the substantial
real appreciation of the ren-
minbi that is required, a step
revaluation of the renminbi of,
say, 10 percent in the near
term would seem appropriate.
This move should be followed
by further appreciation, with
the aim, over a horizon of per-
haps three to four years, of
fully eliminating intervention
designed to prevent apprecia-
tion of the renminbi.
• In Europe, policymakers should
not resist appre-
ciation of the euro
vis-à-vis the dollar
so long as it hap-
pens in the context
of global adjust-
ment and does not
imply effective
euro appreciation.
Otherwise if the
Asian currencies
were to appreciate
against the dollar,
then the real effec-
tive exchange rate of the euro
would depreciate. If Europe is
not to run a current account
surplus, then the euro will have
to strengthen vis-à-vis the dol-
lar.
• For the oil-
exporting coun-
tries, evidence pre-
sented at the
workshop by Brad
Setser suggested
that significant
adjustment is in
the pipeline, with domestic
absorption rising at a gradual
pace. Therefore, it is not clear
that further actions on their
part are called for (assuming
that the oil price does not
increase again), other than to
maintain the expansion of
domestic spending.
In conclusion, policymakers
should not wait until financial mar-
kets force global adjustment. The
heightened volatility in internatio-
nal financial markets recently
underscores the
risks of an abrupt
market-led adjust-
ment if they fail to
act. It is unlikely
that the policyma-
kers of each coun-
try will resolve
independently to
take actions that
add up to a cohe-
rent package.
There needs to be
an international
effort to persuade each country to
contribute its fair share to a whole
capable of bringing about adjust-
ment without interrupting world
growth.  In principle, the IMF’s mul-
tilateral surveillance exercise pro-
vides an ideal context for organi-
sing such an international effort.
The forthcoming spring meetings
of the IMF will provide a crucial
opportunity to assess progress
made so far and move in earnest
towards reaching agreement on an
adjustment package along the
lines sketched in this policy brief.
‘Japan and China hold
the key to adjustment
in Asia.’
‘In Europe, policyma-
kers should not resist
appreciation of the
euro against the dollar
so long as it happens
in the context of global
adjustment.’